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I think that a great deal of what Kvernbekk, Cohen, Boe-Hansen and Heintz have in mind with 
their evocative metaphor of mission creep is embodied in the kinds of digressions that I have 
examined in third-party dispute mediation, especially the kind that shows up among divorcing 
couples who have to decide on custody and visitation arrangements for their children (cf. Eemeren, 
Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993, chapters 4 & 6; Jacobs, 2002; Jacobs & Jackson, 1992; 
Jacobs, Jackson, Stearns & Hall, 1991). Another interesting forum for such phenomena is the press 
conference, where standpoint emergence itself can be the unanticipated outcome of journalists' 
efforts to pin down the speaker's commitments (Jackson, Jacobs & Zhang, 2020). Mediation 
sessions, in particular, illustrate a possibility for argumentation that the authors do not explicitly 
consider--the creation of a role that amounts to the "top-down" control of the discussion whereby 
the mediator is supposed to keep the disputants on track (Jacobs & Aakhus, 2002a; 2002b). The 
problems mediators face look very much like mission creep problems seen as a problem of top 
down control. Space does not allow me to dive into the examples of digression and emergence 
discussed in those papers, but suffice it to say that a great deal of their dynamics hinges on the way 
the local demands of immediate response become untethered from the overall and initial purposes 
of the exchange, on the problems of balancing and managing what turn out to be competing 
multiple demands, and on the general communicative difficulties of expressing the relevance and 
pertinence of any particular move not just to the immediately prior move but to the overall set of 
issues and purposes in play. As the authors note, the local, the contingent, the immediate, and the 
open-ended nature of argument response all work to Here, let me look at some exchanges that 
highlight properties of mission creep that I think are consistent with the authors' analysis, but are 
not emphasized the way other properties are in the paper. 
 First, the bilateral quality of argumentation makes for some paradoxical consequences as 
to what mission creep looks like. It depends on your point of view. Consider the following example 
(from Jacobs, 1985, p.158). The exchange occurs during an initial psychotherapy session between 
a young female patient (Pt) and a middle-aged male therapist (Dr). The references to "them" in 
turn 01 and to "they" in turns 04 and 06 are to the patient's parents.  
 
01 Pt:  I don't want them to have anything to do with my life, except ((pause)) 
[security (?) 
02 Dr:  [You live at home? 
03 Pt:  Yes. 
04 Dr: They pay your bills? 
05 Pt:  Yeah 
06 Dr:  How could they not have anything to do with your life? 
 The example illustrates a rather recognizable pattern of argument that Bleiberg and Churchill 
(1975) dubbed a "confrontation sequence." I further analyzed their example in Jacobs (1985).  
From the doctor's point of view, the entire exchange is an exemplar of a well-executed plan of 
argument. The simple, well-placed yes/no questions are phrased in declarative form to dramatize 
the obviousness of answer. Each answer would seem barely contingent--almost guaranteed. And 
the punchline rhetorical question comes soon enough in turn 06 and is phrased with enough 
incredulity that the patient is left in obvious contradiction, forced into backdown, and no doubt 
feeling a bit stupid. (Interestingly, a characteristic response to the punchline in this kind of 
sequence is not an open backdown or even an answer at all, but awkward silence. See Eemeren, 
Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993, chapter 6). In fact, take out the feelings of being stupid, 
and what we have in this exchange would seem to be a model example of Socratic dialogue and 
dialectical logic.  
 I doubt the patient thought of it that way. I expect that if she was thinking about plans, 
she was thinking more along the lines of Mike Tyson's quip: "Everybody's got a plan until they 
get punched in the face." I doubt the patient saw the punchline in turn 06 coming, at least, not 
when she made her initial complaint or when the doctor asked the first question. Maybe not even 
after the second question. But, at least from her point of view, the exchange must have looked in 
retrospect a lot like the kind of sidewreck that rests on the localized end of the mission creep 
spectrum. There is a sense in which every refutational line of argument and every line of rebuttal 
is designed to end in an outcome not intended nor desired by at least one of the opposing parties. 
 Second, the bilateral dynamics of mission creep reveal argumentative possibilities as 
inherently open-ended. When both sides of a (potential) dispute are alert to this interpretive 
possibility (your plan is my fog), the dynamics of argumentative interaction can be genuinely 
open-ended. In the case of confrontation sequences, once the target suspects the point of such 
questioning, looming traps can be avoided, and even turned around, as another example shows. 
 The following exchange (See Jacobs (2018, pp.270-271; adapted from Jacobs, 1986, pp. 
162 & 163). M1 and M2 are Mormon missionaries who have come to S's home. M1 is explaining 
that the Mormon Church is different from other churches because Mormons believe everyone 
must be baptized. You can see that the missionaries are trying to get S to backdown from her 
claim in 04, whose simple negation lets it stand as denial of their distinctive tenet in 01 without 
having any actual independent content to rebut. The question-answer sequence in 03-04 already 
marks a shift in issue. In turn 02, S had expressed what might look like an agreement, but oddly, 
in the context of a proselytizing session stands as an obstacle to the missionaries' presumed long-
term goal: to get Mrs. Jackson to convert to the Mormon faith. If disagreement with this tenet of 
faith is not the basis for resisting conversion, some other basis must remain unexpressed. 
Whether it is because the missionary's question in 03 suggests that her statement in 02 creates 
this sort of "problem" or it is just because of the ties and well-pressed white short-sleeved shirts, 
S is clearly suspicious that she is being led into a trap. And S's answers to the subsequent 
questions can be seen as designed to avoid getting caught in such a trap even if she can't see 
exactly how the questions are supposed to lead her into a trap or exactly what the trap amounts 
to. What is interesting is that when the senior missionary (M2) tries to spring the trap anyway, S 
initiates a mini-counter confrontation sequence. Now, it is the missionaries who are seemingly 
caught in a contradiction of their own.  Now, they must seemingly either backdown from some 
presumed but unexpressed stance motivating their line of questioning or else they must defend 
themselves regarding a whole new issue that they probably never anticipated opening up. 
 01 M1:          . . . Okay? So there's one- one difference. ((pause)) Okay? 
[We believe every- 
02 S:  [My church believes that too. 
 ((pause))  
03 M1: Uh, well what do you believe? 
 ((pause)) 
04 S:  I don't believe that. 
05 M1: You don't believe the Bible? 
 ((pause)) 
06 S:  No:, not- ((pause)) Well I don't believe that uh, uh, uh, put into the context 
of our times that that's true. 
07 M2: Wellll, does Jesus Christ change from age to age? Does he change? 
 ((pause)) 
08 S:  The world has changed. 
09 M2: Does Jesus Christ change? 
10 S:  No, but that doesn't mean that the meaning of his words doesn't.  
11 M2: Oh, but it does. 
12 S:  Uh- heh-heh-heh ((nervous giggle)) 
13 M2: Mrs. Jackson, I think you need to find out what you believe, first of all, 
((pause)) You've got to find out- reach down inside of yourself and find 
out what you believe. 'Cause it sounds like you're not even sure of what 
you believe yourself. 
14 S:                       Do you believe that unbaptized babies cannot be saved? 
[That if they die, and they aren't— 
15 M2: [Oh nno! We don't believe in infant baptism. That it's- We don't believe 
it's necessary.  
16 S:  Then why are you- why are you telling me that my beliefs are inconsistent 
because I say that I don't believe that baptism is necessary? 
 
 I think one of the things that the mission creep analogy highlights that is also 
corroborated by examination of actual cases of interactional argumentation that spin out in 
unexpected directions is that tree-diagram type planning of how arguments get extended and 
played out rests on a misleading picture of argument carried over from the tree diagrams of logic. 
Tree diagrams in logic suggest that argument works in a closed system. Actual argumentation 
works in an open system. There is no way to specify in advance, even in principle, all the 
possibilities for the various extensions, turns in direction, issues, problems, tactics, and topics 
that might arise once an argument is initiated. Linguists have recognized it as the 
generativity/creativity problem; cognitive scientists as the frame problem. It is time that 
argumentation scholars recognize it too, and if the term, mission creep, calls attention to this 
property of argumentation, then sign me up.  
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